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DPP - A Taiwan Tragedy 台湾悲剧民进党 

DPP - A Taiwan Tragedy 台湾悲剧民进党 

DPP used to be a well organized and effective political movement. Its platform of democratic reform and Taiwan independence attracted wide support, especially among the professionals and intelligentsia, and it was highly skilled in combining street demonstrations and journalistic declarations that caught the Kuomingtang government in an awkward position of not being able to either suppress it nor to let it be. DPP implemented a successful programme of gradual takeover of municipal governments, where its officials were able to demonstrate administrative competence and personal integrity, till it controlled a larger part of Taiwan than Kuomingtang officials, and was able, with the help of Kuomingtang internal division (deliberately or otherwise engineered by Lee Teng Hui and James Soong), win the 2000 presidential election.

Since then it has gone steadily downhill. Faced with a legislature with an opposition majority, it attempted to implement its policies through various types of manouvre; with an economic system still containing strong public participation because of past government investment initiatives, it attempted to wrest control of major corporations and regulatory bodies by displacing past KMT appointees with its own followers. While these are to be expected, they gave scope for improper procedures and corrupt practices, which could have been controlled if the individuals showed greater public spirit, farsightedness, professionalism and self discipline, or if the party machinery, prosecution system and journalists had played a more competent and less partisan role. Whereas corruption existed before, it had been carried out in a more orderly and less blatant manner, whereas today both the administration and the corruption have become amateur and out of control.

While a number of intellectuals previously close to DPP were at last driven to sign a declaration demanding the resignation of Chen Shuibian in early July 2006, the DPP party congress chose to pretend that everyone was fine, and the only problem they had to solve was intra party faction fighting, and passed a meaningless resolution to dissolve factions. Individuals who previously made some critical remarks against low moral standards, all toed the line at the congress and went along with the inaction, for fear that any negative display would cause Chen and his supporters to switch resources and votes to rivals in the party. In other words, they acted to protect their current "local optimum", knowing very well that the party as a whole will continue to slide to its "global minimum" when each individual acts this way.

DPP never had an effective China policy; in consequence, it also had no economic policy in view of the importance of China for the economy of Taiwan, and no diplomatic policy since China looms so large in Taiwan's relationship with the rest of the world in particular USA. Now it has shown itself to have no internal policy either. The party still has a large body, but events have shown that it has a empty mind. Whatever ideas it might have had, it has shown itself to care so much about power and money that it can, and indeed has, given up everything else.

It now has to convince the taiwanese people that, despite its complete lack of mental aptitude, it deserves their votes in the Taipei-Gaoxiong elections coming up later this year, the legislature election next year, and the presidential election in 2008. How will it fare? Who knows. Maybe an empty-headed DPP is exactly what Taiwan likes to have, and that it finds happiness sharing the great tragedy.

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=70

民进党未上台前是很有效率的组织，每次搞些示威文宣可以弄到国民党政府不上不下，又不好镇压又不好不管。他们的反专制，搞独立政策得民心，尤其得到专业人士和学界支持，采用成功的地方包围中央政策先在各市县选举成功，建立起有效，清廉治理形象，碰到2000年李登辉宋楚瑜引起国民党分裂赢了总统选举，但以后就每下越况。因为立法院反对党是多数，政府用各种其它途径运作，并设法用自己的人取代有官股的各大公司管理层和经济监督机构人员，但因而制造了很多舞弊的机会。如果那些牵涉的人有自律，为公，远视，职业操守，或党，监察和媒体系统能公平运作，这些趋向自然会得到控制。国民党时代虽然也有腐败一面，但自有其规律不做得那么难看。

等到一批以前亲绿的学者们看不过眼出来要陈水扁下台，民进党开党代会却视而不见，只是通过了些无意义的取消党内派系的决议，连吕秀莲等批评腐败的人士也随流以免失去党内支持。也就是说，短短几年的权和钱，已经弄到民进党头脑空洞无能自救了。所以要民进党发明解决大陆关系，经济，外交各方面难题，希望似乎十分渺茫。这也只能说是台湾的悲剧。

台湾悲剧陈唐山 Chen Tangshan - A Taiwan Tragedy

陳唐山是 美國 普渡大學 地球物理學 博士 。长期在美國從事台灣獨立運動，李登辉上台后政治气氛改变 1987年 政府 便允許陳唐山返台 1988年 陳唐山出任 台灣國際關係中心 負責人，負責 游说 美國國會 。1 992年 加入 民主進步黨 ，並且當選僑選 立法委員 ， 1993年 12月在民進黨提名參選第12屆 台南縣 長，並且當選.1997年與中國國民黨提名的立法委員洪玉欽競選第13屆台南縣長時也以囊括台南縣66%的選票高票獲得連任。陳唐山擔任台南縣長期間政绩甚好，不凸出個人知名度，极有口碑。

2000年陳水扁當選總統後，2001年陳唐山於台南縣當選第五屆立法委員。2004年4月，陳唐山出任外交部長與國際合作發展基金會董事長。虽然没有职业外交背景，但能得到总统府和深绿人士信任所以当时外界对他十分看好。但不久后新加坡因副总理李显龙再快升任总理前访问台湾，为修补同大陆关系。2004年8月，新加坡外交部長楊榮文於聯合國大會上發言攻擊台独，陳唐山在部內接待僑胞時，以「新加坡那樣一個鼻屎小的國家」、「捧中國卵葩(台語中指男性生殖器)」批評新加坡奉承巴結中國，曾引發不小爭議。

2006年1月，陳唐山出任總統府秘書長。其后陈水扁家人不断牵涉各种同商界关系金钱来往丑闻，需要陈唐山出面澄清，发放许多不可靠前后矛盾的信息，令他信誉一落千丈。2006年7月初一批亲绿学者发出宣言要求陈水扁下台，学生黎文正等人，在中正纪念堂广场绝食静坐，过了好几天陈唐山到来看视时，被骂狗，有没有良心等恶言；勉强安排学生代表进总统府递晴愿书，但也因见不到陈水扁本人而不欢而散

像陈唐山那样原有个人信誉，人民支持，国际朋友，都是一种资本，给今天陈水扁领导的民进党像个败家子那样挥霍，再加上他自己的错误， 已经完全消耗了，这又是台湾的一个悲剧

台湾悲剧马永成

马永成出生年是1965，刚过40岁。他在学生时代已经富有运动组织经验，因此认识陈水扁，与同年代的罗文嘉都出任当时任立法委员的陈水扁国会助理1994年担任立法委员陈水扁办公室主任，并且于1994年台北市长选举中出任陈水扁竞选总部执行总干事；陈水扁当选台北市长后，马永成出任市长室参事，1997年罗文嘉因“拔河事件”辞去新闻处长后，由马永成出任新闻处长，1998年转任台北市政府新闻处长与市政府对外发言人。2000年陈水扁当选中华民国总统后，马永成出任总统府机要秘书，2005年改任总统府副秘书长，因为与罗文嘉，都长期跟随陈水扁，成功后被称为“罗马时代”；

台湾几十年来的经济发展政府有很大主力推动，所以不少大公司政府有控制股份能委派管理层人员。陈水扁上台后把这类权力集中在总统府内，渐渐养成商界人士跑来总统府内做游说运动的风气，希望通过总统家人或助手的帮助影响任命或控制权分配的决定。陈水扁本人其实知道这类麻烦以少惹为妙，但他夫人吴淑珍以前在选举活动时车祸受伤瘫痪，留在家里喜欢有人拜访聊天，听了这类游说后就同马永城商量要他去出面干涉，渐渐引来了更多游说的人和事情，而有关两人同商界来往的闲话也越来越多，又鼓励了陈水扁其他亲人朋友到处找机会，结果在2006上半年一起爆发，不可收拾。马永成也因此下台辞去总统府职位。

其实马永成本人为自己弄到的利益有限，似乎只是在婚礼的时候邀请了一些有钱人送了些礼金而已。 因为马永成罗文嘉与另一些助手如萧美琴等都年轻而且给人很有理想，真诚的感觉，所以有童子军之称。这批人在政经各方面管理无效率，而且在金钱权势面前这样快价值崩溃，不但是台湾的悲剧，也替整个亚洲文化对民主自由的适应提了一个严峻的考问。

台湾悲剧龙应台 A taiwan tragedy - Long Yingtai

龙应台在台湾有极高的知名度，其形象是鼓动自由民主的先行者，又兼有学者，评论家甚至客窜官员的身份，不过她在新加坡的知名，大概只是是因为说过一句“好在我不是新加坡人”谴责她眼里新加坡在民主和言论自由方面的落后。

新加坡是个小国家很注重得到国外知名人士评论，即使是坏的评论也好，至少证明本国值得别人注意。不但把这些评论报道以表示有新闻自由（因为这些话基本不会造成有组织性的政治威胁），而且以后还常常注意这些人，甚至邀请他们常来访问，希望听到后来有所改善的评轮，以显出新加坡制度确实有道理。李敖就是看准了这一点，所以他在中国三间大学演讲说了三套不同的话（据报道是在北大演说后受到了警告）表现不很理想，回台湾一下飞机就改变话题说新加坡人苯，后来又说愿意到新加坡去在大学之类的场合详细讲述自己的看法，结果没有得到什么反应不了了之 （我有些发言请看

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=112 ）

这是一种互相利用或好听些“双赢”。

台湾的社会比起新加坡来的确是缤纷多彩，不过面对各种严重问题的台湾，

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=70

恐怕不能那么迷信光靠言论自由就能造成优良思想得到上风，各党派吵吵闹闹，就能让好的政策获得支持和实现运作。

台湾应该怎样处理同大陆的关系，民进党一直无法找出一条符合支持者愿望又在对岸行得通的路径。龙应台也不例外，但靠象她对连战访问大陆时候冷讽热嘲，和后来对胡锦涛放放言，

http://forums.chinatimes.com.tw/report/lonin/l_main.htm

是解决不了问题的。不要说管理十三亿人口国家的胡锦涛，就算是三百万公民的新加坡，虽然可以在龙应台访新的时候给高规格的招待，甚至邀请她来南大做教授，但新加坡治理国家的一整套方法，就算它想改变也不是那么容易改动的。

近来台湾高层连篇丑闻，主因在于台湾的精英人士缺乏自律精神，而以前的一党专政政府又没及早建立一套监察机制适应民主自由时的需要。龙应台到现在还不能面对这些问题，反而在泛蓝罢免失败后大声称赞这表现了台湾民主的成功，

http://bloguide.ettoday.com/faye/textview.php?file=0000024443

http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110501...

http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/6/28/n1366145.htm

这只能叫做一个台湾民主的悲剧。

房子在着火，称赞路边有水龙头，证明城市计划优良，恐怕不会得到居民欣赏。民主自由居然是这么苍白无力？

http://blog.chinatimes.com/Taipeijk/archive/2006/07/21/80780.html

Long Yintai is a very well know person in Taiwan, a scholar cum commentator cum once government official who was at the forefront of the drive towards democracy and open society. In Singapore she is mainly known for her remark "I am glad I am not Singaporean", indicating her disapproval of what she saw as the backward state of democracy and press freedom.

Singapore is a small country that places much emphasis on comments by well known overseas people, even negative ones, since they at least show the country is worth noticing. Not only are such comments regularly carried in the local media, with the benefit of showing that press freedom exists, later words of such critics are followed and they are frequently invited back to get to know the place better, in the hope that they would make more positive comments subsequently, thus affirming the merits of the Singapore way of doing things. Li Ao, for example, understood this very well. After his 2005 trip to China, during which he sang three different tunes in speeches at three universities (it is said he received a warning after his first speech in Beijing, causing him to say good things about the communist party afterwards), thus putting the verdict on his visit at risk, as soon as he got off the plane he tried to change the subject with comments like "Singaporeans are less smart". Later he offered to visit Singapore and clarify his views by speaking at universities, an offer that expired from lack of response. (I made some comments on this

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=112 ）

This is a kind of win-win dynamic between the overseas critics and the Singapore establishment.

There is no doubt the political scene and public life of Taiwan are much more lively than Singapore's. Taiwan, however, faces serious problems

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=70

and it cannot simply depend on freeranging discussions to ensure that the best ideas will prevails, nor on quarrels between political parties and factions to ensure that the right policies will be adopted and implemented. In particular, the ruling DPP has not found it possible to come up with a set of policies for dealing with mainland China which would be acceptable to its own supporters and the mainland side. In this area Long Yingtai had no idea to offer; her most prominent efforts have been her mocking treatment of the mainland visit of the Kuomingtang team under Lian Zhan and her demands to Hu Jingtao to change his views to be more in tune with the thinking of the people of Taiwan.

http://forums.chinatimes.com.tw/report/lonin/l_main.htm

Considering, however, that despite the high profile treatment given to her during her visits to Singapore, a small country of 3M citizens, it has not adopted her suggestions, it is hard to envisage Hu, who has to deal with problems of 1.3B people, could easily make changes in the mainland political system because of what she said.

With numerous scandals plaguing the highest levels of the Taiwan government, originating in the poor self-discipline of members of the Taiwan elite (on both partisan sides) and the failure of the former one-party government to put in place an effective public monitoring and prosecution system needed in the new open environment, Long Yingtai also had very little to say. Instead, she praised the failed impeachment effort as proof of Taiwan's working democracy:

http://bloguide.ettoday.com/faye/textview.php?file=0000024443

http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110501...

http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/6/28/n1366145.htm

In other words, while your house is on fire, you praise the presence of water hybrants on the side of the street as example of good urban planning. This display of the impotence of a democratic and open society can only be described as Taiwan's tragedy.

Poor Li Ao; so soon after he said Taiwanese are smarter than Singaporeans, all those scandals broke out surrounding Chen Shuibian, and the Taiwan government is virtually in paralysis. It will be embarrassing to be asked "now what do you say?"; on the other hand, it will perhaps be even more painful to him if nobody remembers it or bothers to ask; Li Ao does not like to be neglected; if asked, I am sure he would be able to make up some answer, which may or may not be consistent with what he said in the past, which may or may not even make sense in itself, but it gives him another chance to get his name into international papers...

In this way, he is really very similar to Chen Shuibian, which is why, despite his reputation for relentlessness on people in power, especially authoritarians, he has seldom criticized Chen.

Poor Li Ao 可怜李敖

可怜李敖；不久以前他刚刚说台湾人比新加坡人聪明，然后就来了一大堆围绕陈水扁的丑闻，令整个台湾政府瘫痪。如果有人问他你现在怎么说？不免尴赅。不过，也许没人问更糟糕；李敖不喜欢人家忘记他；有人问，他一定会想出一个回答，不一定前后符合，甚至不一定有头绪，不过至少又给他一个上国际新闻的机会。

在这方面，他其实跟陈水扁差不多；就是因为这原因，虽然李敖有对当权者不留情的名声，他以前很少攻击阿扁

the article below was written in early 2001, but the terrorist acts on World Trade Center and Pentagon have change things. USA will be too preoccupied with the Middle East to devote effort to Taiwan independence; it may have the desire to promote it, but may not have the will, nor the spare means.

The China Legacy of George Bush

Which George Bush? The two Bushs are conjoint in this, and both derive from the legacy of Ronald Reagan.

The saying goes that Some are born to greatness; some achieve it; and some have greatness thrust upon them. Safe from contradiction by the dementia ridden Reagan, one can thrust all kinds of greatness on him. Domestically, his "voodoo economics" tax cuts are supposed to have made American economy more efficient by forcing people and businesses to rely less on the government; internationally, his threat of "star wars" exploited superior American technology in control engineering and computer hardware to start an arms race that bankrupted the racially unstable Soviet Union, which officially broke up during the presidency of Bush Senior, who went on to the spectacular gulf war victory.

China was Bush Senior's domain of expertise, but China gave his presidency a rocky start, when the aging party leadership of Beijing, instead of caving in to student demands, sent tanks into Tiananmen Square, and instead of collapsing in the face of international disapproval and isolation, presided over an astounding phase of economic progress. It would have been galling for the Bushs to watch the slick but ethically dubious Bill Clinton go to China and curry favour by announcing his opposition to Taiwan independence. Having evened the score with Clinton by defeating his chosen successor Gore, it is time for Bush to try to initiate the disintegration of the Chinese evil empire in the same way Reagan did with SU.

The Bushs know many "good Chinese", Hongkong migrants managing chopsuey restaurants in Houston and Washington DC, Taiwanese engineers in high tech companies, and mainland computer programmers running internet sites. These people obviously admire the American way of life, and their friends back home obviously think similarly; the "bad Chinese" are the communist leaders who impose a contrary ideology on a powerless population, which await American leadership towards freedom and democracy. Such a lagacy, which eluded his father, seems within the grasp for George W, and the starting point must be Taiwan.

For over fifty years America has held its hand on Taiwan independence. It has never publicly said "we encourage it", nor even "we will defend Taiwan if it declares independence". USA even came near to accepting the One China stand, with the joint declaration when establishing diplomatic relation with Beijing "USA acknowledges that both sides of the Taiwan Straits accept the principle of One China, and does not dispute it", which however leaves the wriggle room: if Taiwan no longer accepts One China, then USA is free to follow suit.

USA has deliberately left its stand on Taiwan ambiguous because it wants Taiwan to make its own effort and sacrifice for independence first, without a guarantee of underwriting from USA. In the same way, USA and Western Europe affirmed the integrity of Yugoslavia, without giving it any help to arrest the process of disintegration, and continue to affirm the current status of Bosnia and Kosovo despite their obvious untenability.

But this ambiguity would not last much longer, for George W only has another seven and half years, at most, to create his legacy on top of the legacies of Reagan and Bush Senior. He is however mistaken about one thing: the division between "good Chinese" and "bad Chinese" is much more subtle than Americans figure it. The majority of Chinese, on both Mainland and Taiwan, who admire America, admire it as a powerful and resourceful opponent, rather than as a good friend. One can do business with an opponent, even obtain patronage from him, but that is not the same as friendship.

When the US spy plane was forced to land on Hainan island, there was little sympathy for US demands for immediate release of plane and crew ANYWHERE in Asia, Taiwan included, for USA was seen as the powerful party using its superior technology to pry secrets from a weaker opponent, a bully. Even the most pro-independence Taiwanese would have considerable misgivings about American support: it is absolutely necessary, yet dangerous to rely on. If it comes to war, and Taiwan suffers from missile showers and sea blockades, the people would be asking "why are we doing this? why are we helping USA to achieve its geopolitical objectives?"

In summary, George Bush's pursuit of his China legacy is a highly risky move, for Taiwan as well as for himself. It might have been better to just praise Reagan, bury him, and forget him.
-----------
Taiwan Independence policy

Is it right for taiwan to seek independence? This is not really a very useful question to ask. Historically, China has a clear claim of sovereignty to Taiwan, but history is also full of cases of parts of countries going independent. The real issue is whether the vast majority of Taiwanese believe in it and know how to go about it in the right way. So far, they have been in a muddle.

We often heard "Taiwan would suffer economically if it was part of China." So does it mean that when China is prosperous, it becomes a good idea to be part of China? Or "Taiwan is free and democratic while China is authoritarian." So if China reforms itself, then independence would no longer be a good idea? Maybe Taiwanese people should work to improve China rather than put their effort into separation? Indeed many business people investing in China use that justification, instead of the purpose of making money, but in doing so, they have already made independence a more difficult policy.

While both sides would suffer economically in case of hostility, China is willing to accept this and, being much larger, can cope with the consequences better. For years Taiwan had hoped that the economic cooperation would make China more amenable to treating it as an equal; it is only now facing up to the reality that the situation is the reverse. That China has been taken a superior, bullying attitude towards Taiwan, or Taiwanese are genetically different from Han Chinese, etc, might make good cocktail conversation, but are irrelevant as arguments for independence.

A real issue Taiwan has not faced up to is the anti-independence minority. Right now, close to a million Taiwanese people live on the mainland, with 300 thousand in Shanghai alone. Is everyone comfortable with their staying there if a separation occurs, and would others still in Taiwan be allowed to follow, taking their money with them? Would those who stay behind be allowed the political freedom to work for reunification? It is certainly not going to be practical policy to pretend that the problem does not exit.

It seems to me that Taiwan has been assuming that, since for all practical purpose it is already independent, full independence can be obtained merely by getting other nations to recognize it as independent and by joining world bodies as a member equal to China. They have even now not given up on this simplistic idea, as in the 2002 visit of vice president Lu to Indonesia: stopped at Jakarta airport and sent to Bali, she declared it a human rights violation to stop her from having a holiday, then got help from the Indonesian Golkar Party to enter Jakarta via chartered flight to make an interparty visit, thus changing her story half way - so maybe China was correct to protest against a visit since it was not just a holiday? Furthermore, by demonsrating the open split within the Indonesian political system, her visit was hardly a good way to make friends. (The problems during Mrs Chen's visit to America were less fundamental, merely diplomatic inexperience. A new attempt to sneak Chen Sui Bian himself into Indonesia in December 2002 failed when the news leaked in Jakarta papers just before departure. Even when the 2004 referendum proposal attracted US criticism, the immediate reaction was to send another delegation to visit worldwide, and as soon as the election was over, the vice president went on a trip, deliberately getting two stopovers in USA, but was only allowed to use west coast cities away from the political centre. The same happened with Chen's own trip to South America.)

The Taiwanese governments (both DPP and KMT) and people are so used to doing this that they fail to see the rest of world would in due course get fed up with the tactic; there might be initial sympathy when attempts to have "relations" are thwarted by China, big bullying small, and anyone criticizing the tactic as unproductive, in taiwan and outside, are conveniently attacked as sucking up to the big, undemocratic bully, but it wont be long before everyone develops a thicker skin, ignores the name calling, and goes where their interests lie. The trouble with Singapore, whose deputy prime minister (and soon to be PM) made a "private" visit to meet Chen Shuibian despite Chinese criticism, then attempting to mollify china by repeatedly and very visibly re-iterating its opposition to taiwan independence, shows a pattern that is going to be repeated with others. Even real friends of Taiwan do not like to be put on the spot to choose sides, and repeatedly.

The example of Tibet should provide a sobering lesson: it was de facto independent for half a century, and hoped to use British and Indian help to establish its full independence status. Yet, despite the very weak claim of sovereignty China had over Tibet, the Tibetans were unsuccessful. While the reasons for their failure were complex, their lack a of simple and coherent stand was certainly a contributing factor. While today the Tibetans extoll Dalai Lama, in the 50s they were much more divided. Religion was considered by many to be backward superstition, while China represented both modernity and anti-imperialism, versus British exploiting opportunities to take territory from Tibet. In due course, China made good its claim.

When masses have to be mobilized for a tough and dangerous struggle, a simple and coherent message is vital - any complicating factors would become excuses for hesitation and backsliding. But simple messages are often also slightly dishonest, since they ignore inconvenient complexities. A degree of ruthlessness and cunning is always necessary to come up with messages that are sufficiently based on reality to be creditable, but not hesitating to sweep inconvenient quibbles aside. Up to now, I do not see such a mental framework on the part of the independence advocates.

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I asked several people from PRC and they all thought war unlikely, in fact because they are contemptuous of Chen Shuibian (he is just trying to win election), but I think this is precisely the kind of thinking that leads to war

it is quite correct that none of the three sides china taiwan usa want a war, but that's almost irrelevant; anyone seriously relying on that really doesnt have a meaingful view on this

it is also quite true that taiwan would not dare to declare independence without usa support, and usa does not want to support and load itself with responsibility; but that too is little comfort; the whole point is Chen Shuibian using every opportunity to manouvre usa into a situation when not supporting would be seen as weak and may threaten usa's international position and internal consensus; people should take note of how successfully he has manouvred KMT from its previous positions

in his attempt to manouvre usa, his intention is of course to avoid war, hoping that usa would frighten off china; but china would be manouvring usa from the other direction, and the process can get more complex than any side was prepared for: in order to prevent usa from supporting taiwan independence openly, china may have to say "we will take military action even if usa gets involved", and manouvre itself into a position of no retreat

similary, Taiwan may work itself into a position of no return: it has to take the posture of not being afraid of war, indeed, of being prepared for it, as Chen came close to saying in the Washingtonpost interview soon after his reelection; in fact the reporter believes he implied it; the comment of Premier Yu that taiwan need to be able to strike back with missiles confirmed the idea in a more open manner, though recently it has become unfashionable to lable this kind of macho stanze as taiwan patriotism

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added in March 2005: a KMT delegation is about to visit the mainland, first to pay respect to various KMT monuments, then to meet the chairman of the political consultative committee (united front) in beijing, marking the first official KMT-Chinese Communist Party contact in a decade (or half a century, since the 1992 discussion was formally between two NGOs); this would have been unthinkable just a couple of years ago, since DPP would have been able to attack it as betrayal of taiwan, but curiously, Chen Shuibian's own attempt to label names like Republic of China as anti-taiwan, has made association with such names favorable to the mainland, while taiwanese gradually accepted the names as mere "historical formality". In short, a safe gap now exists for an anti independence minority to function in taiwan for at least the moment, allowing China to give concessions to Taiwan while letting non-government parties to take credit

Taiwan's Twin Tragedy 台湾双亡

when terrorists rode the two airliners into WTC, they did severe but temporary damages to NY and USA, but permanent damages to Taiwan: preoccupied with the middle-east, George Bush had to ease off from his previous "whatever it takes" defense of the place, but even greater damage came from within: elected with great hope for a new era for taiwan starting in 2000, Chen Shuibian had by September 2001 already begun to show weak competency of governance; by then rumours were spreading that Zhang Junxiong, the second premier he appointed since taking office, was already in a shaky position (the first was Tang Fei, a Guomindang veteran, in the hope of utilizing the greater experience of the opposition party in administration, but he hardly lasted a year); Zhang managed to survive only to 2002, and his successors You, Xie and Su did not last much longer either. Other cabinet members also tended to have short tenures, in particular the financial minister - there were six of them in as many years, one more than premiers.

Instead of taking a back seat as prescribed in the constitution, Chen and his staff in the presidential office constantly interfered in ministerial appointments and appointments of senior executives of publicly owned corporations and regulatory bodies, as well as major administrative decisions, making it almost impossible for the premier and his ministers to deal effectively with queries and criticisms from parliamentary members and reporters

But worse was to come, starting from the first half of 2006, previous unconfirmed rumours of bribery involving presidential staff and Chen family members began to be backed up by solid evidence, starting with a photo showing several senior officials at a casino in Korea, after they denied making the visit paid for by corporations involved in major government contract work. Soon almost everyone working in close proximiy to Chen was found to be involved in something or other, with the large items concerning his wife! Curiously, somehow his Democratic Progressive Party members always managed to uphold their faith in him, with the support only starting to crumble now.

The greatest beneficiary of the twin taiwan catastrophies has been the Beijing government, which has been concerned, with increasing stridency as yeara passed, about the taiwan independence threat. With US support in doubt and its own leaders in disarray if not discredit, whether through their own involvement in corruption or by their support for those involved, the independence movement has gutted itself from within.

911对美国的损害是短期的，对台湾却是长期的：美国忙着处理中东问题，已经没有精力大力支持台 湾，只想保持现状而以。但台湾更大的伤害出自内部：陈水扁2000处当选，第一任总理唐飞（是国民党老将来帮助没什么行政经验的民进党）只干了一年就下 台，第二任张昭雄到2001 9月也已经不稳，总算挨到2002才换，而以后的三位游，谢，苏也不十分长久，而其他内阁官员也是不停换，尤其是财政部长，6年换了6个

宪 法是规定总统不直接管理行政的，但总统府人员经常干涉高级官员和官营公司执行人员任命和各种重要决定，令负责的部长们很难有效面对议员和媒体的询问攻击； 更糟糕的是由2006上半年开始，流传了很久的有关总统府官员和家人贪污的故事开始得到硬的证实，第一件是一张照片拍了某些官员在韩国一赌场 - 他们早些已经否认了去那里得到有大量政府合同的公司的招待。以后各种证据不断浮现，而最大笔的牵涉总统夫人吴淑珍。

台湾双亡的受益者是大陆；多年来越来越紧张的台独问题，已经因为台独领导阶层的名声，因为他们自己的贪污或死硬支持贪污的人，受到严重损伤，暂时不构成威胁

How long can Chen Shuibian last? 阿扁能顶多久？

I have no special source of information, just a matter of common sense. It hinges on one's estimate of the outcome of the 2008 election. If it is obvious that DPP cannot win, then by resigning before the end of his term and allowing Vice President Lv Xiulian to take over, he can obtain a parden from Lv. As long as there is a fighting chance that DPP might still win, he would not quit.

As for when this prospect becomes certain, it would have to be 2007. At the end of 2006 there will be elections of the mayors of Taipei and Gaoxiong. Assuming that the DPP vote % is miserably low, the current wavering supporters, including the prospective 2008 presidential candidates and their support groups, who are still unwilling to antagonize Chen for fear of losing out in the intra party competition, and the various pro-DPP tycoons whose financial support is needed, would finally abandon him. He would be asked to quit before the 2007 legislature election, in the hope of making the party look a bit better during the campaign, and be promised a pardon, maybe for himself only, maybe for his family as well, after the election is over and the pardon would no longer affect the outcome.

用常识来判断，陈水扁在任期满前下台，吕秀莲可以赦免他的各种贪污罪行，甚至把他家属也包括 在内；挨到2008恐怕就得不到这个优待了。也就是要看他自己和现在还不敢/不能放弃他的支持者，包括还希望能竞争2008总统位的四大天王，捐钱给民进 党的富人，判断2008年是否完全无望，这要到2006台北高雄市长选举过了才看，而辞职应是在2007年立法院选举之前，希望对选情有些帮助，而宣布赦 免会在选举结束后。

I dont think the time for resignation has arrived yet, and Chen Shuibian would try to provide a legal defense with some sort of promise to quit if conviction ensures; however, the support he managed to rebuild in the last couple of months (partly due to the alienation of public feelings by the disruptive protest movements) will start to crumble, building up to a climax around New Year.

虽然吴淑珍已经被起诉，我觉得下台的时候还没到。陈水扁会设立一道法律辩护防线，同时给些如果定罪就下台的承诺；但是他这两个月重新组织起来的支持团（部分原因是施明德运动引起公众不满）会开始崩溃，大概今年底明年初会达到终点。

see also

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=204

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=204

http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-XIIfDzQobqO5oCYM9UTvZzgKHH4Org--?cq=1&p=212

added on 11 Nov:

the nobel laureate Li Yuanzhe's open letter calling on Chen to "consider" going is among the first steps of this process of crumbling; Li's endorsement of Chen in 2000 played a major part in pushing him over the top

李远哲公开叫陈水扁考虑下台即是崩溃的开始；2000年李对民进党的支持起了临门一脚的功用

added on 13 Nov:

Several DPP seniors have started to mildly suggest that Chen considers stepping down, with one pointing out the legal issue that an amnesty can only be given after conviction so that he need to do it early to ensure end of trial occurs while Lv Xiulian is still president; however, I think this is mistaken: Chen can plead guilty and avoid a lengthy trial. Still, I give him till early 2007 as the crumbling pocess takes time.

几为民进党大老开始建议陈水扁考虑下台，其中一位指出要先定罪才能赦免所以需要早些下台有足够时间让吕秀莲在审判定罪后赦免他；不过我觉得这不对：陈可以自动认罪避免长时间的审讯。我还是觉得他会挺到2007年初因为支持崩溃刚开始。

added further on 13 Nov

in another step of the process of crumbling support, two DPP parliament members have quit to protest against the party's support for Chen

民進黨林濁水、李文忠今天上午宣佈辭去立法委員抗议党继续支持陈水扁，这是崩溃步骤的新一项

added on 22 Nov

ma yinjiu's problem with procedures for utilizing special allowance funds is a godsend to abian; he might again rebuild his support base

马英九的特支费手续问题是阿扁的救命灵丹，他又可以重建他的保皇团

added on 29 Nov

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/11/29/2003338366

another step in the crumbling process: chen's long term assistant luo wenjia spoke out about the mistake of starting on the wrong foot by lying, and then having to tell more lies to cover the initial lie

支持崩溃又一步：阿扁的长期助手罗文嘉批评他开头不该说谎偏要说，弄到以后要说更多谎来遮盖

added on 15 Nov: it seems the twin catastrophies are growing into 2.5: Ma Yinjiu has been dragged into the issue because some of his Mayor expense accounts have similar problems, that reimbursement claims were sometimes made with unrelated invoices; his defense was that many small items were claimed together using a large, unrelated item invoice for the sake of convenience; technically, this is still a violation of rules, and there is the problem of whether the small items were proper expenditures under the budge in the first place; his supporters have since requested the same investigation into various DPP's accounts, which most probably have similar violations, so the issue is going to snowball

I am amazed at taiwan's capacity to self destruct, not just in the cost to the people concerned, but also the time spent by those who attack them; no one gets any work done

马英九被人告发说他的市长特别支出费也有 跟陈水扁的国务机要费同类的问题，就是用无关的发票报账；他的说法是因为很多支出太小，个别报麻烦，所以加在一起用其他面额大的发票报。这还是犯了规的， 而且要问那些零碎费用本身是否尊规。现在他那边的人又去告发民进党那边高层也有同样做法，所以这件事越滚越大

台湾倒真有能力自我毁灭,不但是哪些牵涉在内的人的麻烦，还有攻击他们那些人花的时间；好象人人不用做事

中华商业银行和花莲企业银行有存户挤提出现已被中央银行接管；这虽然是金融事件，但同台湾整体政策失败关系密切，是另一根稻草

added on 7 May 2007: the 2008 presidential race will be between Ma Yingjiu and Xie Changting - both under the shadow of being charged for corruption, Ma already under legal proceedings while Xie's case is still pending. Now that too is a nice reflection of Taiwan's situation, quite aside from the fairness of the accusations.

2008 大选会是马英九斗谢长庭；不多不少两人都面临因贪污被起诉；不管这些罪名公不公平，这情况还是反映了台湾现状

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