Like others, I consider 4 June 1989 to symbolize an important missed opportunity in China's path towards democracy, but not in the sense others usually meant: I thought it was the demonstrators who should have done things differently.

On 4 June Zhao Ziyang went to Tiananmen and warned to students, in tears, that military force was about to be used to clear the square. Later that day the various leaders, in particular Cai Ling and Wuer Kaixi, decided to make their escape. They had a great deal of cash on hand, mostly donations from sympathetic organizations in Hongkong and Taiwan (some of which were presumably CIA fronts, though I dont consider this to be a significant issue - their influence on events was limited, relative to the dynamics of the events themselves), and took most of it with them. They did not advise their followers to leave, however, and instead encouraged them to remain and continue the stand, thus condemning many of them to death, injury and arrest, not a good record to leave behind as democratic revolutionaries.

Suppose the leaders did the reverse: asking the followers to leave when there was still time, but they themselves remained in the tent, waiting for the troops to come and arrest them later that night? They would have gone down in history as heroic figures, and provided inspiration to all those who wish to promote Chinese democracy. The risk involved would have been very low: many officials and journalists were sympathetic, including Zhao Ziyang himself, and the retaliation they might have suffered would have been low. Further, as China subsequently opened up, they would have been symbols, even leaders, of the new way of life, and there was a good chance that the party system would absorb them and make them high officials - accepting rebels and warlords as nominally subservient followers is a well established method in Chinese history.

Instead, Cai Ling and Wuer Kaixi, by getting help from relatives and bribing officials, escaped to USA, and thoroughly discredited themselves by living as celebrities. Their subsequent contribution towards the democracy movement was negligible. Others such as Wang Dan were less lucky, and languished in prison for a number of years before being allowed to go overseas, but they too failed to revive the movement.

But in other ways, the effect of their failure was even more disastrous: Zhao Ziyang was blamed for weakness, in not suppressing the Tiananmen occupation in May while it could have been done without military force, thus allowing the matter to blow up beyond control, and in failing to go along with the 4/6 suppression. Moderates were discredited and hardliners like Yang Shangqun rose in influence. If the students had dispersed peacefully, the moderates could save face by pointing to China's tolerance and openness, and though some would have gone down anyway, at least some would have survived better.

Before Tiananmen, there was some real chance that Hongkong and Taiwan could be able to play a part in helping China to modernize and democratize; afterwards, the Party was much more suspicious and took much harder lines towards the two territories. This was partly responsible for the catastrophic turn of Taiwan politics since then, while Hongkong gave up all attempts to be assertive towards Beijing, in part because the 1997 Asian financial crisis caused a great loss of self confidence and Hongkong was in need of economic concessions, such as allowing mainland tourists to visit the territory.

In China itself, the failure of the previously promising idealistic, tolerant spirit meant that, when the opening up actually came, it was purely commercial, and the whole of Chinese culture, in politics, business, education, research, entertainment, literature, and just about anything else, went down before crass commercialism.

Like the officials they struggled against so briefly and so pathetically, the student leaders were products of the same system. They knew little about democracy and liberty and were ill equipped to fight for them. Both at Tiananmen Square and in China or elsewhere afterwards, they failed to build up organizations and movements that followed democratic practices, but instead ran little self-centred shows that were, even at their best, ineffective against the collosal and historical Chinese system of authoritarianism.

I pity those still trying hard to overturn the verdict of 4 June: they did not learn the right lessons and blame the right participants.

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in case anyone thinks I am to rosy about China - no I am not, though the following article exaggerates the situation a little

杜均立：白领凋零，黑领升起

才仅仅10年之前，白领还是一个全社会人人称羡的身份。万科地产甚至将其出版的系列图书命名为《白领》。白领是指那种在高级写字楼里上班的专业技术人员，特点是高学历、高收入。特别是写字楼里外资企业，更是白领群体云集的根据地。
　　白领意味着体面的工作、优雅的修养、丰富的精神体验。从某种意义上讲，白领简直成为时尚的代名词。 　　白领必定毕业于名牌大学，甚至是硕士、博士或海归，每天朝九晚五打卡，坐在格子间的电脑旁，MSN，麦当劳，卡布奇诺，丁克，地铁，打的，坐经济舱，住星级宾馆，泡吧，煲电话，听蓝调，加班，圣诞节，斯诺克，暂住证，红酒，抽555，住租来或按揭的公寓，买简约的宜家家具，收藏CD，谈论《老友记》，向往xz，留恋于丽江，铁杆驴友，不看中文报纸不看中国电影，看《国家地理》《名牌》《读书》杂志，看卡夫卡看张爱玲看伊朗电影，洁癖，乡愁，健身，瑜伽，养吉娃娃，香水衣服鞋子泡吧旅游鲜花买书买CD看电影，月光一族。
　　白领的产生是中国市场经济发展初级阶段末期的典型现象，证明了“知识改变命运”。白领大多只出现在一线城市。面对WTO的前夜，这些有文化有知识的年轻人开始尝试一种西方发达国家中产阶级的雅皮士生活。绅士与淑女，是充满这些新思想的青年人的人生目标。《了不起的盖茨比》和《傲慢与偏见》是他们的必读书。爱情、教养、文化、艺术、体验、精神贵族深深地吸引着他们。
　　10年过去，物是人非。回头看看，当年怀着白领梦“范进中举”，当许多大学生兴冲冲踏出大学这个高级职业培训监狱大门的时候，却必须接受与黧黑的农民父亲同场竞聘的残酷现实。曾经的白领已经老去，在一场百年不遇的经济危机面前，破产的破产，失业的失业，离婚的离婚。当孕育白领的贸易、广告、房地产、IT和制造业风吹雨打流水落花，脆弱的白领蓦然发现，曾经雪白挺括的领口，已经被冰冷的汗水因得皱皱巴巴一片姜黄。春天来的时候，老去的白领继续徘徊于物价和房价飞涨的城市。伫立在林立的写字楼脚下，他今天会收到一个面试通知么……白领的传说就这样陨落了。
　与此同时，一个充满神秘色彩的社会群体已经夺去了全中国所有的光芒，他们开着“自己的”大排量名牌汽车，出入高档酒楼，高级夜总会，乘坐头等舱或软卧，住星级宾馆，拥有黄金位置的几处豪宅，购全套红木家具，在位置最好、景观最佳，装修最豪华、质量最安全的办公楼上班，独立办公室，不打卡，饭局，会面，喝茅台五粮液，品天价普洱，抽极品中华，精装《毛评二十四史》，VIP，炒股投资保险理财，收藏古玩字画珠宝黄金，高级会所，劳力士，路易威登，奢侈品，国际顶级品牌服饰，高尔夫，公派出国，移民，护照，拉斯维加斯，美容减肥按摩，组织体检，疗养，免费医疗，贵族学校，MBO，脱产学习，党校，佣人，情人，养藏獒，带薪假……
　　他们就是在全中国一线二线三线城市遍地开花，全面掘起的新兴黑领阶层。相对于干干净净清清白白的白领，他们的衣服是黑色的，汽车是黑色的，脸色是黑色的。他们的收入是隐蔽的，生活是隐蔽的，工作是隐蔽的……所谓隐蔽，就是像站在黑夜里的黑衣人，你知道他在，他也知道他在，但你不知道他什么样，在做什么。他们就是就职于政府和官有垄断企业的那个庞大群体。
　　10年间，官有建筑已经屡屡刷新了所有中国城市的高度。在气度辉煌富丽堂皇的官方办公楼面前，商业写字楼登时被压出逼仄吝啬的寒酸来。从容积率、配套、装修等各方面，拔地而起的“大裤衩”成为城市黑领新贵们的“鸟巢”。白领和他的OFFICE一起，被黑领的裤衩遮住了所有的阳光。
　　10年间，通过土地财政和垄断政治权力，官方组织一步步通过各种手段将社会财富向自己手中集中。不仅以重税和重复收费罚款的方式，从横向上苛刻聚敛社会财富，而且以资源浪费和环境污染等方式，从纵向上大肆透支谋夺子孙后代赖以生存的根基。官有经济在垄断的无竞争市场所向披靡，源源不断的暴利如滚滚长江。水气电油电信金融烟草卫生教育海关公路等行业自不用说，即使出版、邮政、新华书店、市政、环卫、公交、盐业、矿业、铁路、民航、文化、体育、新闻、旅游、土地等这些领域，因为禁止自由竞争，其利润之丰厚仍足以使任何外企眼红得流鼻血。在当下中国随便哪一个城市，一个大腹便便的税务监管员都可以开着路虎SUV上班，他的办公室面积有多大、装修得有多豪华不必说，只消告诉你一句，他可以在单位里健身桑拿游泳……
　　一个刚刚工作两年的警察就已经买车买房——没要父母的钱也没按揭……一个国家电网公司的抄表员基本月薪达到8000元……简单推算一下，全国有1000多个省级，20000个厅级，好几万到十来万个县级，这还不包括北京的中央部门和军队警察系统。较发达地区普通黑领年收入10到20万元极普遍，年终发个十万元奖金不是什么稀奇事，而这也不仅仅是税务部门才有这个财力。
　　这是“合法”的收入，这一部分财产是不怕公示的。去年就有新闻称，南方某地所有的黑领都有两部车，而且很正常。人类都知道，对黑领来说，收入绝对不止薪水这一块，医疗交通吃喝拉撒贪污受贿等等，所有的地方都享受纳税人无偿供养，每月的车贴甚至比农民工辛苦一个月的薪水还要多，他们也可以在超市买个床单裤衩都开发票报销，或者把免费领来的大量昂贵药品卖钱。甚至嫖娼也要发票。可以说，所谓黑领，就是除了没给其配备法律意义上的配偶外，其它都是享受无偿供给的。
　　黑领阶层之所以生活水平急剧提高，是因为其垄断了包括政治、法律、经济、信息在内的一切社会资源，他们消耗了至少一半以上的中国国民收入。他们的掘起，构成了中国新二元社会的显赫一极。这个群体虽然相对数量少，但是绝对数量庞大。粗略估计一下，这种以寄生垄断为业的黑领在全国约有2000万以上。
　　比起10年前苍白的小资白领来，只有这些享受和垄断了政治权利的人才真正的实现了几代中国人的梦想，他们绝对已经达到甚至超过欧美发达国家生活的水淮。当然，另外一极的其他“普通老百姓”则是标淮的第三世界贫穷国家的国民。来自官方背景的黑领对来自民间草根的白领的颠覆，体现了政治权力向自由经济领域的渗透和僭越，以政治权力篡夺经济权力。这种食利自肥的经济身份使官方的超脱精神和公益基础遭到侵犯，合法性受到玷污，政治的伦理尊严荡然无存。官方由民众的仆从变成“民主”——民众的主子，由公共利益的正义仲裁者演化为自身利益集团的代言人，从国家和社会的守夜人退化为自私卑鄙的盗窃者。这是一种极其危险的倾向。
　　白领阶层可以说是开放的，或者说穷人的孩子可以通过读书实现白领梦。正因为如此，白领在大学扩招后人力资源充沛的中国急剧贬值。相对而言，黑领阶层则完全是封闭的，正因为封闭，才会奇货可居炙手可热。公共机构实际上已经成为官僚权力集团把持的私家后院，普通人家的孩子要想进入这个群体，理论上说不是不可能，只能说——很渺茫。不错，公务员是公开招聘的，垄断官方企业的职位也是面向社会招聘的，只要你拥护那个党，你就可以报名考试。
　　但地球人都知道这里面的规矩——潜规则，考不考得上并不取决于考试分数。黑领的特殊之处是已经走向组织化和正在走向世袭化，前者巩固，后者继承。在白领黯然陨落之后，黑领的低调掘起在全社会引发了一轮又一轮的考公务员热。同时，黑领也成为所有商家追逐的目标，他们比白领具有更真实更强悍的消费力。他们走到哪里，哪里就物价飞涨；他们对地产的投资，使农民失去了土地，使白领丧失了家园。当白领遇见黑领，立马被压出西装下面的“小”来。
　　今天，一个供职于夹缝状态私企的所谓白领，以他微薄的收入仅够维持温饱而已，消费对他来说已经是一个太过夸张和绝望的词语。不久前官商云集（没有几个身家低于千万）的两会上，一个黑领代表或是同情或是鄙夷地建议小白领们应该去卖肉——不是出卖自己的肉体，是卖猪肉。在这场席卷地球的金融风暴中，无数外企破产倒闭、业绩滑坡，覆巢之下，纷纷裁员降薪，白领们仓皇失业。与此相反，中国官有组织却财大气粗逆市飘红，令世界500强为之羡慕，黑领们仍然可以毫无罪恶感的集体加薪。
　　近水楼台先得月，砸向黑领掌心的4万亿投资计划如同一针鸡血，使无数红了眼的黑领们激动得加额称庆——还是中国好、组织好啊。说实话，贫困潦倒的白领们从这4万亿民脂民膏中想捡点残羹剩饭也是痴心妄想。所以说，“孔乙己”这样卑微的白领如何能与“假洋鬼子”这样傲慢的黑领同日而语？如果说白领曾经掀起一股托福热、小资热的话，黑领的江湖则使传统国学和势利文化大热。易中天的阴谋学、王立群阎崇年的帝王学、于丹的犬儒学和马未都的收藏学等等，无不映照了黑领这个社会核心消费阶层的形成。
　　黑领的兴起说明，20年前的那场轰轰烈烈的反腐败反官倒运动之后，新兴知识群体在与权力群体博弈中已经完全丧失了主动权。权力经济终于在近10年从量变到质变，完成了对知识经济和自由经济的彻底颠覆。权力组织在文革后重新收复了对共和国的垄断话语权。近年来热映银屏的《激情燃烧的岁月》、《军歌嘹亮》、《金婚》和《天下兄弟》等剧，集中反映了文革时期第一代黑领的优裕生活。权力特权下的文革被营造被演绎得无比温馨富足和谐，根本看不到知识阶层生不如死和农民阶层食不果腹的悲惨灾难。
　　这种以主旋律色彩出现的怀旧情绪充满复辟邪恶和美化罪恶的企图。曾经的党校高材生、当代厚黑学大师冯仑老板毫不客气地把白领鄙视为“房奴”，一个“奴”字撕下了一群人看似体面的假领。诚然，白领没有任何社会权利，没有罢工权，没有选举权，没有话语权；他们没有权势，没有资本，没有门第。相反，黑领则是这个国家的上帝选民。
　　他们的房子票子车子等等除过老婆之外，都一概享受无偿配给，几乎不用跟“普通老百姓”们争来抢去的所谓市场发生任何关系。白领是如此脆弱而不堪一击，一套小小栖身的房子就可以将其压垮；而黑领是如此坚不可催固若金汤，一场导致无数孩子死亡的“三鹿”惨案，也未见一人因职务犯罪被追究法律责任，仅仅纪律处分了事。因为对立法权和司法权的把持，黑领群体成为名义上和实质上的共和国公民，他们普遍享受到一个共和国公民所应当享受的一切政治权利。
　　从基本人权、财产权、公民权、选举权和一切社会福利，他们都应有尽有的得到了充分保护和满足。与之相反，日渐普遍和经济失宠的白领群体则无法享受到基本人权保证，更遑论公民权和社会福利。他们被官方称之为与“公民”相对立的“普通老百姓”或者“群众”。相对于“共和国公民”而言，“普通老百姓”在政治层面和法律意义上，仅相当于“人畜”、“奴隶”或者“机器人”。他们经常被官方作为十几亿的巨额国家财产来看待，说好听点叫作“劳动力资源”。其对外的称呼为“人民”，多用在“伤害中国人民感情”的时候。白领的陨落代表着知识精英的穷途末路和理性精神的落败，黑领的兴盛代表着权力意识形态的扩张，和反知识重权力的血统论和阴谋论王者归来。
　　“知识贬值”必然带来“读书无用论”的盛行，中国社会从此向封建资本主义进一步靠拢。社会文化日渐沙化和盐碱化，重归流氓文化和宫廷权谋黑幕政治的覆辙。黑领对白领的阻击和绞杀使构成未来社会主流的新兴中产阶级胎死腹中，建立宪政公民社会的启蒙运动被迫土崩瓦解。这种财阀与权贵的合力扼杀使一个民族的创新能力和创造力严重退化直至丧失。社会结构和信息结构进一步被凝固被肢解，青年一代被年迈保守的既得利益者压制封堵在社会最底层。
　　健康的社会流动和财富循环陷于停滞，推动社会进步的活力和源泉被窒息被堵死。胜者为王的狼图腾文化、不择手段的官场权谋文化、暴殄天物的面子文化和崇高伟大的满清皇帝戏之所以大行其道，正映射着白领规则的陨落与黑领规矩的升起，中国社会由知识和文明的艰难复苏，无可挽回地退回到野蛮与无知的权力通吃、弱肉强食中去。
　　往高处走，水往低处流。在全社会的羡慕、嫉妒和仇视之中，黑领阶层一方面继续低调的巩固其社会地位（政治地位和经济地位），另一方面在完成原始积累后，他们开始悄然向新大陆挺进——携款外逃，或者投资移民，实现自己正式加入世界发达国家高级人类的梦想，同时也使自己的后代永远彻底的摆脱水深火热的中国。摘自胡记茶行《对现状的分析——挤不进去，你永远是穷人》：据官方统计，2004年中国农民人均年收入2936元，按年人均纯收入低于668元的标淮，中国农村绝对贫困人口为2610万人。如果按照世界上公认的人均1天1美元以下就属贫困的标淮，我国目前还有2.1亿贫困人口。“八五”期间，公车车辆消费占到全部国家财政支出的38%，整个国家总计支出37960亿中的37.58%用于供养行政公务人员；公款吃喝公费出国年花费每年达9000亿元以上。
　　中国社会阶层分类：第一个阶层（也是处于最顶端的王者阶层）是由几百个家族组成，他们拥有骇人听闻的财富，是这个国家的掌控者。在他们之下是第二个阶层——地方性的豪族，数量也许是几万家，这些人控制着地方的权力，自然也拥有无与伦比的财产。第三个阶层是由公务员，事业单位人员、国企管理人员、垄断国企人员和私营企业主等这些人中的佼佼者以及顶级白领阶层等这些群体中的人员组成。第四个阶层是生活比较安逸的一般民众，他们经济上还算比较宽裕，但是社会地位不高，对社会没有什么影响力。第五个阶层是由城市平民和农村中生活比较好的农民组成。第六个阶层是贫困群体，也就是四亿没有购买能力的民众。第七个阶层是一亿没有财富的赤贫阶层，第八个阶层就是最后那一亿灾难性赤贫的阶层。

Courage? or just recklessness in the heat of the moment? The man was willing to die for the cause, but only for a short time; he disappeared shortly after and all attempts by foreign journalists to find out who he was failed - presumably because he was afraid to come forward

As a military officer, the commander of the first tank performed badly. He should have ordered a couple of soldiers to jump out of the vehicle and drag the guy aside, maybe giving him a couple of blows to the face to satisfy his desire for martyrdom.  

民主,平等这些理想当然是好的,抗议,甚至造反也可以是有理的,不过六四那些领导人员离理想太远了;寻正"认为中国的大学生缺乏民主精神，学生们急着投票选举了高自联，而高自联对学生又极度缺乏约束能力与约束行为，这些都与民主精神相差太远"很有见地,不过他们生长在不民主的环境里,学到的只是海瑞罢官,买好棺材向皇帝抗议这类本质是封建的手法,这倒也难怪他们,问题是他们连这种中国传统精神也无法贯彻

那天赵紫阳亲自去天安门,流着泪劝说他们离开以免受伤害,然后柴玲吾尔开西等主要人物就决定逃走,但并没有叫跟从的群众也撤退逃命,反而鼓励他们留驻继续斗争,结果有不少那晚伤亡或被捕;这是领袖人物应有的作风吗?

如果那晚他们叫群众散开自己留下,等着被捕受审,在法庭上继续宣扬民主,冒的风险并不多,因为他们有很多党内支持者包括赵紫阳,事件过后那些开放派也受到牵连,至少有"处事软弱不及时解决让问题闹大"的罪名.如果那天民运领导拿出令人尊敬的英雄气概,让事件和平解决,不但对开放派有利,以后中国真的开放的时候他们会成为风云人物,甚至可能得到招安成为高级官员.

他们的懦弱,和部分人物到了美国后的虚荣表现,不但令他们失去领导作用,使民主运动无力振作,也引起更坏的后果:两方面都失去理想,所以中国开放只引进了最粗糙的商业化,令当代政党和各方面文化包括教育,科研,影视,文学,都趋向腐败.

六四领导人物那天离开时,还每人分了一批手中的现金;这些主要是香港台湾支持者的捐款,但里面有一部分似乎来自美国,台湾情报机构设立的一些所谓基金会研究机构.六四事件引起中国政府对海外影响的高度不信任,使台湾香港都失去帮助中国民主化的机会,北京对两地的方针也趋向强硬,台湾当局的失望间接造成这几年来,部分民众盲目跟随独派,小人当权,当地政治每下愈况,而香港则完全失去了原有的个性,(一部分原因是97年亚洲经济风暴后失去自信,也需要中央批准各种经济支持)这些对中国的发展都是某种损失

所以我认为,不懂民主的民运人物,对民主路程功少过多,不一定能得到历史认可

section{Fa Lun Gong}

Ten years later, China had n become the new home of the Asian economic miracle. Its trade surplus with USA is not far behind that of Japan, and Made in China goods flood world markets, affordable even to struggling East Europeans and South Asians. All the major cities are booming. The exiled leaders of the June 4 movement, who escaped earlier in the evening while encouraging their followers to stay and die, were all but discredited. Hongkong was successfully returned under the One China Two Systems policy.

But a new protest movement had arisen, gaining sudden prominence when several thousand followers of Fa Lun Gong (Law Wheel Power), a form of Qi Gong (Air Power) or breathing exercise, suddenly appeared one day outside the Zhong Nan Hai compound, the residence complex of the top leaders. Before long, the organization was denounced as an evil cult and a nation wide ban was declared on its activities. Many were arrested, and in January 2001 five of the cult followers tried to commit suicide in Tiananmen Square by setting themselves on fire. Supposedly a movement for good health, Fa Lung Gong has become highly hazardous to one's physical well being.

What is Qi Gong? It is believed that by taking a particular posture and doing a carefully regulated regime of breathing, a person can cause some form of energy movement inside the body, thus increasing health and strength. Many practitioners claim that the exercise made them feel more relaxed and happier, which sounds realistic in today's fast paced, highly stressed environment. This could also have some carry-on effects on their physical well being, but claims beyond the level are made, and this is where problems
arise.

These additional claims relate to two other long standing practices: the meditation exercises of Zen monks, and the more recent Gongfu stories that talk about numerous forms of ``inner power" (Nei Gong). In both, the meditative posture and inner efforts are supposed to bring on some communion with the force of nature, to promote enlightenment in one, and develop fighting power in the other. Fusing these two into one, there is much folklore about the legendary fighting power of Shaolin monks, and the celebrated ``One Finger Zen" story:``A great Zen master answered all questions about enlightenment by raising a finger. One of his disciples began to imitate him. When the master saw it, he chopped off the disciple's finger. As the disciple ran away bleeding, he looked back at the master, who raised a finger; at that moment he was enlightened" was confused with the Gongfu claim of being able to disable a person by poking a finger at his critical points.

This then got fused with another Chinese tradition: Tao priests claim that by drawing talisman figures and incantation, they could move spirits and invoke natural forces, whether to bring rain during a drought, shift mountains to build roads or canals, etc. If Qi Gong can invoke the forces of nature to strengthen one's body, it should also go the other way, allowing one's body to control nature. With that kind of thinking, the claim that Fa Lun Gong would build a Law Wheel inside your body, which you can turn to do all kinds of wonderful things, would not seem to be far fetched.

So we can understand Fa Lun Gong being adopted by poorly educated people unfamiliar with modern scientific ideas; we can even understand that some of them are easily incited by local leaders of Fa Lun Gong practice groups into sit-in protests against critics of the groups and then against officials who try to restore order and enforce laws against trespassing and illegal assembly. What is more puzzling is why so many educated people, in particular students and faculty in US and other overseas universities, would suspend their disbelief and use the world wide web to propagate the claims, even endorsing them as scientific. In fact, without such overseas endorsements, it is unlikely that the claims would have enjoyed the widespread acceptance in China among the politically conscious groups.

It is said that the economic liberalization of China has destroyed the ideological system, leaving a vacuum for something new. While that might explain what happened to some party members, does anyone seriously believe that Fujian peasants and Chinese students in Stanford used to find comfort in Marxist sociology and Mao's theory of revolution, and once these are abandoned by the Chinese establishment, have to turn to superstition? The peasants have probably believed in one kind of superstition or another all along, and something that promises not only surviving doomsday and afterlife in an oriental heaven (in parallel with the Christian heaven for caucasians), but also good health without medical bills in this life, must be quite appealing to them. The intriguing question is about the Chinese living in the west.

The vacuum they face is not so much in ideology, as in culture as a whole. What part of Chinese culture can an overseas Chinese hold onto in a meaningful way? The answer is: curiously little.

Take the example of Confucianism. For it to have survived that long, and to be able to continue its well entrenched status in East Asian political systems, it must possess some real strengthes. Yet, almost all connotations of Confucianism are negative in some way: authoritarian, morally conservative, resistant to change, obscure, comical... Lu Xun is generally acknowledged as the greatest modern Chinese writer, but while his contribution in exposing the dark side of traditional Chinese society is undeniable, it is far harder to see what constructive ideas about organizing the modern Chinese world he could be credited with. Now if a Chinese cannot explain to a westerner what is so great about Confucius or Lu Xun, what can he say to get across the grandeur of Chinese culture? How does a parent convince a child that their cultural roots are worthy of an effort to retain?

New migrants frequently suffer from discrimination and exploitation, and for them, psychological comfort lies in the twin thoughts (a) I make sacrifice for the next generation; and (b) one day I will go home and it would all be worthwhile. But if one feels that the next generation would be culturally unrecognizable, and home has nothing attractive to return to, then the seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Chinese intelligensia in the West.

Tiananmen Square used to be known for two things: the morning crowds doing their Taiji shadow boxing, and mass rallies for the latest political campaigns. The slow, carefully regulated movements of the body prescribed by Taiji (which means literally ``universal supreme") are supposed to give the practitioner enhanced control over both body and mind, and conceptually relate to the art of soft defense philosophically embodied in Taoism and physically used in Judo. ``Playing Taiji" is also used to denote bureaucratic buckpassing and subtle ways of saying no.

but on the night of 4 June 1989 the square rang with the rumble of tanks and machinegun shots: after a monthlong occupation of the square by students protesting against authoritarianism and corruption, and after all peaceful means to clear the square failed, the army moved in. After the bloodshed, many commentators have written about the bankrupcy of communist ideology. Without wanting to defend communism, I would suggest that the behaviour of the ruling Chinese regime actually has little to do with communism itself, but is merely the continuation of traditional feudalistic practices in a modern form.

Communism includes many strands of ideas, and out of these, three may be singled out for attention: 1. The element of Marxist Political Economy: Marx hypothesized that the political processes of a society are determined by its underlying economic processes. Technological developments produce changes in the economic structure, and consequently lead to changes in the political and social structures. History is therefore driven by technology and economics.

Though Marx's own study of history, economics and politics had many critics, there seems no reason to doubt that a close connection does exist between economics and politics, and even the most ardent capitalists are in some ways good followers of Marx. For example, any comment along the line "the recent events in China show that economic liberalization must be followed by political liberalization" is merely repeating a Marxist truism. In contrast, in attempting to achieve a capitalist style economy without significant political reforms, Deng Xiaoping was acting contrary to basic Marxist theory. Mao, who believed that a cultural revolution was needed before China could be modernized, was a closer follower of Marx.

2. The element of Marxist Social Utopia: Marx forecasted that in due course, the proletariat would rise up to implement a new social structure in which the private ownership of capital would be abolished, and eventually there will be a utopian society of plenty in which everyone will, without coercion, work to his best abilities and take only according his needs. Marx was, unfortunately, rather vague about how to make this happen and how long it would take, and his own organizational efforts were generally political as well as financial failures, but this has not stopped old and new communists from continuing to profess belief in this utopian prospect. Liberal capitalists are usually not utopian: if they believe in utopia, usually they do not wish to impose their choice on other people, while most right wing capitalists would leave paradise in the hands of God. On the other hand, the pro-democracy protesters of China displayed a highly utopian attitude, and were, in this sense, better Marxists than Deng Xiaoping, the great pragmatist.

3. The element of Leninist Party Organization: It was Lenin who invented the practical organizational tactics that allowed a group of Marxists to successfully take over a nation. In this scheme, a tighly knit and highly disciplined party structure is first estalished, to which members are required to devote their total loyalty - personal loyalties and loyalties to common humanity are not only secondary, but indeed suspect and dangerous. The party organization is superimposed onto the government bureaucracy, military command, legislative bodies, trade unions and other community organizations, so that those in control of the party achieve control of all aspects of society.

Because the party controls the economy, it can then claim to have abolished private ownership of capital and therefore begun to implement a communist society; and because the party controls the important elements of the whole society, it can indeed make an attempt to change all aspects of the society towards its version of utopia. We thus have the curious phenomenon that academic theory and utopian idealism have, in time and with excellent logic, led to totalitarianism.

But whereas in the Soviet Union, the Party developed into a privileged elite that manages to incorporate, besides bureaucrats and officials, engineers, scientists, agriculture specialists, academicians and other higher elements of society, in China the party discipline is frequently undercut and superseded by a network of personal loyalties established during the days of the revolutionary army. Thus, although Deng Xiaoping was never Party Chairman, President or Prime Minister of China, for ten years he has effectively wielded supreme power because he has placed into senior positions of the Party and Government, a large number of his former subordinates in the Fourth Field Army, of which he was Political Commisar during the Civil War, and other loyal followers acquired from his work as Secretary General. When the 38th Army showed reluctance to crack down on the demonstrators, Yang Shangkun was able to bypass the Defence Ministry and the General Staff and directly call up the 27th Army, commanded by generals personally loyal to him, to move into Peking. Going back a little into the past, during the Cultural Revolution a small clique around Chen Buoda and Jiang Qin, without any top Party or Government positions, was able to launch a movement that nearly destroyed both the Party and the Government, merely by issuing edicts in the name of the semi-retired Mao. During his thirty years of rule, Chiang Kai Shek was given numerous different titles and positions, but his control had always been effected through his network of military officers and other officials established when he was the Principal of Wampoa Military Academy. Of course China is not the only country where such personal loyalties rule supreme over loyalties to organization, ideology or principles. The politics, civil service, commercial companies and even the universities of Japan are permeated with such oyabun-kobun (roughly, patron-client) relations, in which the oyabun provides patronage and career assistance to the kobun in return for the latter's loyal support. The faction-ridden Liberal Democratic Party system provides a well known manifestation of this system and any observer of the Recruit scandal would have noticed many examples where loyalty to the superior easily overrode party discipline or national interest.

In short, what holds forth in China and much of Asia is a deeply entrenched practice, developed from the age of feudalism, of loyalty to a person rather than to more abstract entities. In traditional feudalism the king divides his territory to be ruled by various lords, who consequently owe him allegiance and will support him with their own followers when called to do so in a war; the lords in turn install knights and petty noblemen, who would then lease out their shares of the land to yeoman farmers or have serfs to cultivate it. The relation of master to servant (or lord to samurai) is both economic and military. In its modern form the network of loyalties is maintained but separately from the ownership of land. Whereas in Japan, the oyabun-kobun relations are established largely in the civilian sphere, the fact that the current rulers of China got in through successful wars meant that the most important relations reflect previous military command chains, which made the Chinese system nearer to traditional feudalism.

Once we start looking at the situation in this light, it becomes much easier to understand many aspects of China. For example, every government in China, regardless of its initial ideology, tended to become corrupt very quickly. For, under feudalistic thinking an official appointed to govern a territory would regard it virtually as his personal property, and would see nothing particularly wrong in lining his own pockets with wealth extracted from his office. A good official is not necessarily the honest Confucian who upholds justice and rejects bribery, or the hermit Taoist who stays away from the palace and refuses appointments in order to remain clean and honest, however much admiration such figures may receive in the literature; but someone who deploys such wealth beneficially, by sharing it with his subordinates and his superiors, and making sure that his territory is well maintained and prosperous. For example, a good official would use his personal wealth to purchase grain in times of poor harvest to feed his people, or spend it for public works. But it must follow that in good times he is entitled to build up his wealth using his office, provided of course that he does not become too greedy or too seriously pervert the course of justice.

Given a strong and competent central government, the behaviour of these local officials may be closely monitored and unsatisfactory ones may be replaced. When the central government becomes weak through neglect, incompetence, external wars, or natural disasters, local administration tends to become very chaotic and corrupt, and an ambitious official, especially one that has control over both military and financial affairs of a region, can easily build up a private kingdom. The history of China is replete with such warlord periods interpersing with periods of unity.

Commentators have often complained that China has not achieved rule of law. In fact, under feudalistic thinking this is impossible, since it requires a subordinate to disobey if a superior gives an order that is contrary to the law; in other words, he needs to have a higher loyalty to an abstract principle than to a person. To the Chinese people, laws are made by men, and can be unmade by them. While some lip service is paid to such abstract concepts as "an emperor must rule with the mandate of heaven", it is seldom implemented in practice, but only used as a last resort to justify rebellion when things become really desperate.

It is also not possible to achieve democracy when people think feudalistically, since a democratic system separates official positions from the persons holding them, and seeks to fill the positions with persons that meet popular approval. Such a concept is obviously contrary to the feudalistic view of office being a personal property given to an official by his superior. Indeed, most Chinese find it curious that no American President that lost an election would ever call in the army to arrest the winner and hence retain office. The idea that the generals and soldiers would disobey any such commands because of their belief in democratic principles is not really comprehended.

One should point out however that it is equally wrong for Americans to believe that, because the 38th Army refused to crush the demonstrators, its soldiers must support democracy. A simpler and more personal explanation is that, most of the officers and men of this army are from the Peking region, and they were unwilling to shoot their friends and relatives in the Tiananmen Square. The soldiers are simply following their usual Chinese way of thinking, namely to be loyal to those with whom there is a personal connection.

To show how deeply entrenched feudalistic thinking is in the Chinese culture, one can point out a number of curious behaviours of Hong Kong and overseas Chinese and the demonstrators themselves. First, following the crackdown, it was widely rumoured that Deng was already dead and Yang had usurped his power in order to bring in the army. This was nothing more than the syndrome of "the emperor is wise and divine, but his ministers are evil." In so readily accepting such rumours, the Hong Kong and overseas Chinese have shown their own true colours. Similarly, those people who believed that the 38th Army would move in to crush the 27th were merely praying for victory of the good warlord over the bad.

Second, the demonstrators centered their most vociferous attacks on Premier Li Peng. Yet, it is known to everyone that Li is no more than the frontman of hardline elders, and could not be described as the main culprit for the undemocratic practices. He is personally not corrupt, though perhaps not all that capable either. It made little sense to single him out for attack, and in doing this, the demonstrators were merely following the very old trick of attacking the boss indirectly through his underlings - the emperor is not to be criticised, only his courtiers. It is also necessary to point out that the same trick was used frequently in the past: for example, before Liu Shaoqi fell, Peng Chen was used as the target. Thus, the demonstrators showed that they were, after all, good students of the same school.

Third, the erection of the Goddess of Liberty very much reminds one of the old practice of putting up a statue of ill defined significance and worshipping it, in the hope of achieving peace and prosperity, just as outside every Chinese home there is a shrine to the God of the Earth which needs to be regularly worshipped, even though no one can ever say what the god looks like and what its powers are. Indeed, the statue put up by the students was highly reminiscent of the goddess Kuan Yin, originally a female reincarnation of Buddha but generally regarded in China as a separate deity, namely the patron of women and giver of mercy. Obviously, few of the demonstrators realized that the original Statue of Liberty in New York carries a message of welcome to refugees and poverty striken immigrants, and has no direct relation with democracy itself.

In short, whereas the current rulers of China have shown themselves to be less than perfect communists, the protesters have not shown themselves to be very good democrats either, and have been rather muddled in their ideological thinking. Those who ask for freedom frequently want the limitation of certain freedoms, such as excessive profit making by enterprising individuals. Those who ask for democracy seem to have little idea of whom they want to elect and what kind of policies they want the elected officials to implement. They extoll Hu Yaobang, who in his life was neither particularly democratic or liberal, could boast of virtually no significant achievements, and impressed the world only with such pronouncements as "Chinese people should eat less rice and more bread." Like the Goddess, he was only being used as a cult figure of ill defined but anti-establishment significance. Thus, the main features of the conflict do not seem to be those of communism versus democracy; instead, both sides are steeped more or less in the far older culture of feudalism.

Because 80% of the Chinese people are peasants and most of the soliders are from the countryside, while the pro-democracy movement is mainly one of the cities, the ruling regime, by virtue of its feudalistic control over the rural areas and the Army, has prevailed. Further, the very old modes of thinking its opponents themselves displayed do not give one confidence that there is sufficient understanding of democracy, freedom and capitalism for reform to succeed. For China, democratic enlightenment is yet to be.